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Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundatiom ofInternational Criminal
Convictiom. By Nancy A. Combs. Cambridge,
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Pp. xi, 420. Index. $125.

Over the past twenty years or so, international
criminal law has developed frorri an establishment
of a norm against impunity for international
crimes to a proliferation of international and
hybrid criminal tribunals, culminating in the
establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). 1 Throughout this evolution and the
6
7
1

Capoccia & Kelemen, supra note 3, at 368.
!d.
StegenerallyMARKA. DRUMBL,ATROCITY, PUN-

ISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).

[Vol. 105

academic discourse accompanying it has been the
inevitable questioning of the assumptions underlying the initially enthusiastic reception of these
institutions. Much of this questioning initially
dealt with whether the punishment meted out by
these institutions actually served the classical purposes of criminal punishment, especially general
and specific deterrence. 2 In a broader context, discussion ensued as to whether criminal tribunals
assisted or impeded postconflict reconstruction.
In these discourses, realists questioned more fundamental aspects of the usefulness of international
criminal trials, and comparative scholarship evaluated the best mix of legal systems to address the
seemingly unique aspects ofinternational criminal
trials of the perpetrators of mass atrocities. 3 In all
of these scholarly perspectives, a presumption
arose that the tribunals functioned more or less as
contemplated on a systematic level, however
unsatisfactory or flawed the analyses or outcomes
might be in individual cases or even types of cases.
Simply put, international criminal tribunals functioned to determine-with the requisite due process-an individual's innocence or guilt relating
to the offenses specifically charged based upon the
most reliable and relevant evidence that could be
obtained.
Primarily, the last part of this presumed equation, the evidentiary aspect, is seriously called into
question in Fact-Finding Without Facts by Professor Nancy Combs of William and Mary Law
School, who served as a legal adviser at the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal prior to her academic career. The modest assumption that international criminal trials might at the least be "useful
mechanisms for determining who did what to
whom during a mass atrocity" (p. 4) is no longer
a safe assumption after Combs's blistering deconstruction of the fact-finding process. The
core of the book is her empirical evaluation of
thousands of pages of transcripts from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the
2
See, e.g., Julian Ku & J ide Nzelibe, Do International
Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian
Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006).

3 ERIC STOVER, THE WITNESSES: WAR CRIMES
AND THE PROMISE OF JUSTICE IN THE HAGUE
(2005).
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Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the
East Timor Special Panels for Serious Crimes
(Special Panels). Combs justifies the obvious
absence of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) due to the relative commonality of education, culture, and language between witnesses and courtroom staff in
the ICTY. In addition, given the prevalence of
African conflicts in the ICC, the flaws in the other
tribunals have more relevance to issues of accurate
fact-finding because the ICC cases thus far do not
have the relative communality of courtroom staff
and witnesses as the ICTY.
The magnitude and prevalence of these factfinding flaws discovered by Combs will surprise
even the most cynical followers of international
criminal law. Given the lack of documentary evidence of atrocities and given the difficulties of
obtaining forensic evidence, it is not surprising
that most evidence comes from eyewitnesses. The
inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony in
domestic trials, particularly for violent crimes, is
well documented and has not gone unnoticed by
the tribunals. Nevertheless, the tribunals have
relied upon eyewitness testimony so inherently
suspect in the way in which it was collected as to be
patently unreliable. For example, in the ICTR case
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, 4 witnesses were asked
out of court to identify a male defendant from a
single picture of a group of individuals, but he was
the only man in the picture, and he had a red mark
on his shirt for good measure. This example is one
of many that Combs provides throughout the
book that are laughable in their absurdity, despite
the seriousness of the flaws that they reveal. In
some instances, the disconnect between the questions asked of the witness and the answers provided demonstrates that the witness had no
understanding of the questions being asked. The
author's painstaking review of the transcripts
reveal, by way of illustration, that a witness being
asked repeatedly about critical timing issues might
well respond with descriptions of clothing and yet
be deemed reliable for whatever information the
witness manages to convey. Among other factfinding impediments, Combs highlights wit4
Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, No. ICTR-95-54A-T
(Jan. 22, 2004).
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nesses' trouble not only estimating distances,
duration, and numbers but also understanding
maps, photographs, and sketches; the failure of
Western court personnel to understand the
answers they do receive; in-court testimony inconsistencies with out-of-court statements; and purposeful attempts to evade questions. Again, none
of these problems is unique to international tribunals, but their prevalence and obviousness in the
transcripts are striking and disturbing. Similarly,
the causes that Combs suggests for these impediments to fact-finding-lack of education and life
experiences, differences in culture and language,
and difficulties of straightforward translationare not as surprising as the extraordinary magnitude of the problems that they produce.
Given these evident and prevalent fact-finding
deficiencies, why have the trial chambers been so
accepting of such faulty evidence? The author suggests that principles of organizational and associational criminal liability, purportedly discredited at
Nuremberg, continue to be influential in the
politicized atmosphere of international tribunals.
The final chapters address the normative questions raised by these fact-finding deficiencies.
Combs suggests various adjustments in the pretrial, trial, and posttrial processes to improve factfinding, but emphasizes that large-scale procedural reform may still be necessary. She proposes
"contextualization" of international criminal procedure (p. 286), with more incorporationoflocalized domestic criminal procedure in tribunals
rather than the one-size-fits-all approach previously taken in the establishment of tribunals.
Another proposal, which she describes as less desirable (and certainly more controversial), is overt
recognition of associationalliability through the
joint criminal enterprise doctrine to "reflect the
actual nature of current tribunal fact-finding" (p.
322).
Ultimately, Combs offers and explains her support for international criminal tribunals regardless
of the fact-finding deficiencies. Drawing inferences of guilt from official positions or institutional affiliation remains problematic, although
less so if the defendants are thoughtfully selected in
the context of the conflict in which they were
involved. She utilizes the scholarship suggesting
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that the proof standard of "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is actually a highly variable standard of
proof that requires different levels of certainty in
different cases. In other words, virtual certainty in
fact-finding and guilt determinations is an illusion
in any criminal justice system and does not negate
other justifications for the necessity and legitimacy
of international criminal tribunals. Her thorough,
expansive, and meticulous research into the tribunals' transcripts provides virtually irrefutable
evidence that the magnitude of these problems in
reliable fact-finding has never been fully appreciated, with all the consequences for international
criminal justice that entails.
At the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American
Society oflnternational Law (ASIL), the International Criminal Law Interest Group sponsored a
roundtable discussion of Fact-Finding Without
Facts with Combs, this reviewer as moderator, and
six other participants: Professor David Crane of
Syracuse Law School and founding chief prosecutor of the SCSL, the first hybrid international
criminal court; Professor Margaret deGuzman of
Temple Law School, former law clerk in the Office
of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and legal adviser to
Senegal at the Rome Conference; Professor Hannah Garry, director of the International Human
Rights Clinic at the University of Southern California School ofLaw and former legal officer in the
appeals chamber of the ICTY/ICTR; Professor
Saira Mohamed of U.C. Berkeley School of Law
and former senior adviser to the U.S. special envoy
for Sudan; Marko Divac Oberg, legal officer at the
ICTY; and Dan Saxon, Leverhulme Visiting Professor of Law at Cambridge University and former
senior prosecuting attorney at the ICTY. They all
offered their own personal views, not necessarily
reflecting the views of the institutions with which
they had been affiliated, but with a wealth of firsthand experience with the fact-finding processes of
international tribunals. No one questioned either
Combs's assessment of the fact-finding problem
or the empirical evidence demonstrating it. As one
commentator remarked, "Nancy Combs has demonstrated that fact-finding at international criminal tribunals is startlingly unreliable." 5
5

The quotations from the roundtable participants

will be available in the 20 11 ASIL Proceedings.
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The roundtable was standing room only, and
the audience heard a variety of responses from the
roundtable participants (and audience) as to what
the appropriate "remedy" for this conceded factfinding deficiency should be. As a result, the discussion assumed the empirical inevitability of her
research and focused beneficially on the appropriate response to these fact-finding deficiencies. The
most discussed aspect of Combs's normative conclusions was the proposition that convictions in
international criminal tribunals may be legitimate, regardless of fact-finding deficiencies based
on realistic assessments of group criminality. In
reinforcing and yet limiting that suggestion, her
book proposes that tribunals should limit their
indictments to the upper-echelon leaders of mass
atrocities.
Oberg spoke of his experience with the ICTY, a
tribunal that, as noted, was not included in
Combs's analysis. He suggested that the tribunals
or the ICC be less insecure in rejecting evidence or,
when evidence is accepted, that the basis of its
acceptance be adequately explained in the judgment. Behind the scenes, he also suggested that the
judges discuss to whatever extent possible each
case while it is fresh in their minds, with summaries to follow. Clearly, putting defendants on trial
as soon as possible while evidence and memories
are fresher is a huge challenge to the international
tribunals evaluated (with the possible exception of
the Special Panels) but perhaps will be less so
with the ICC. To avoid the possibility of convicting an innocent person, Oberg recommended that
the solution to such a problem is to indict fewer
persons.
Saxon expanded upon Oberg's experience with
the ICTY to speak to other reasons why the ICTY
might have experienced fewer problems identified
by Combs, aside from the relative commonality
suggested above. One of the most intriguing
suggestions was that-whatever violations might
have occurred-each party to the armed conflict
have professional officers and soldiers in their
units and well-educated civilian leaders. One need
look no farther than the Geneva Conventions for
recognition that mandatory education in the laws
of war is every state's responsibility, not just for its
military but also for its civilian population. If the
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most developed and privileged countries in the
world do not educate their populace in the
humanitarian laws of war, what expectations of
compliance can be imposed on paramilitary
groups in less stable situations? The educational
requirements of the Geneva Conventions are
often overlooked, if not totally ignored, for civil
society.
Mohamed concluded that associational responsibility is not as discredited in international law as
many scholars might assume. She demonstrated
that associational doctrines at Nuremberg were
not totally discredited and that certain associations (the SS, SD, Gestapo, and Nazi Parry leadership) were determined to be criminal organizations. She endorsed Combs's suggestion that
associational doctrines, especially extended joint
criminal enterprise (JCE III), might be used to
reduce reliance on unreliable eyewitness testimony. For future development of the law in the
ICC, Mohamed noted that it is not cleat whether
JCE III is an available form ofliability under the
Rome Statute, unfortunately making it less likely
to remedy deficiencies in fact-finding in that
forum. She offered another justification for associationalliability-that is, to place blame appropriately for mass atrocities on states and institutions rather than on a handful of perpetrators.
DeGuzman examined how the goals ofinternational criminal punishment may have co be reevaluated to allow expanded reliance on group criminality in international criminal tribunals. In one
of the book's most challenging perspectives,
Combs evaluates whether proof"beyond a reasonable doubt" is not the actual standard even in those
legal systems that herald it, minimizing the significance ofless than certain factual determinations.
DeGuzman challenged the concept that international tribunals should accept a standard of proof
that" can encompass a relatively broad probability
range" given the purposes to be served by international criminal tribunals (p. 344). Even assuming
the legitimacy of group criminality, deGuzman
noted that the suggestion that this assumption
be combined with prosecution of only the top
organizational leaders would not seem to serve the
purposes of retribution, deterrence, community
reconciliation, historical record creation, or inter-
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national law formulation. In the book, Combs
addresses these arguments by suggesting that most
international criminal facts simply cannot be demonstrated with the optimal level of certainty.
The importance of empirical research is that it
challenges the unsubstantiated assumptions of
researchers who have proceeded in theory based on
such assumptions. If Combs's empirical research is
essentially unchallenged, as is likely, it is a gamechanger for how international criminal justice
should proceed. It is noteworthy that the author
herself does not take these fact-finding deficiencies
as negating the value and legitimacy of international criminal tribunals. It would be far too easy,
and inappropriate, to use Fact-Finding Without
Facts as an argument against recognition of
international criminal tribunals as instruments of
justice.
Crane made the final remarks of the roundtable
discussion. He pointed out that we are only fifteen
years into this experience of multiple international
criminal tribunals, "at the beginning of the beginning" of international criminal justice. Crane and
Combs agree that her findings bring to the fore the
need for more utilization of domestic courts to
punish mass atrocities. In addition, perhaps, nonadversarial domestic measures may be more effective in context, such as the town hall program
started by Crane for cultural awareness and public
education in Sierra Leone. He noted that what he
called a "grand experiment" in international criminal justice-the establishment of the international criminal tribunals- has shown relatively
little creativity or flexibility in the form that it has
taken so far. As more tribunals are starred and as
the ICC defines itself beyond the four corners of
the Rome Statute, the most fundamental question
going forward is the concluding question in
Crane's remarks: "Is the justice we seek the justice
they want?"
Fact-Finding Without Facts provides hard facts
about evidentiary deficiencies in international
criminal tribunals to advance the purposes of
international criminal justice and to confront
some hard truths in any criminal justice system
along the way. As noted, Combs does not in any
way advocate ending international criminal tribunals, but the book is a bold and persuasive call for
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a new, wiser, and more realistic beginning to this
beginning.
LINDA A. MALONE

William and Mary Law School
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